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1Abstract
In this dissertation I attempt to provide a cogent reading of Heidegger’s 
fledgling account of the being of language.  Emphasis is placed on the analysis of 
language in Being and Time in particular; for it is with respect to Being and Time that 
interpretations of Heidegger’s fledgling account are developed, and against which 
his mature account is usually contrasted.  Amongst these interpretations are the 
derivativist and instrumentalist accounts of language, which suppose that language 
is itself pre-figured by a pre- or non-linguistic grasp of phenomena.  Against these 
accounts, the structure and arguments for which I lay bare, I contend that language 
is in each case already there, meaningfully articulating the world, affecting 
understanding ab initio; that language is not therefore prefigured by – and in the first 
instance absent from – the being-in-the-world which is our own.  This, I claim, is 
also Heidegger’s stance; a stance which, formed in Being and Time in essence, founds 
his subsequent, increasingly dedicated thinking about what language, as such, ‘is’.  
In addition to my critique of instrumentalism and derivativism in this 
dissertation, I contest the contemporary pragmatist reading of Being and Time
inasmuch as it is occasionally employed to champion a non-linguistic normative 
pragmatism with which to explain just how a non- or pre-linguistic grasp of 
phenomena might properly occur.
As such, this dissertation encourages the reorientation of the philosophy of 
language (as well as contemporary thinking about Heidegger’s own account of the 
phenomenon) away from the temptation to think language ‘formally’ according to 
an hierarchical structure of being-in-the-world, and towards the role and function 
of language in the structural articulation1 of the world itself, human being-there, 
and the hermeneutic tradition in which we inevitably find ourselves to be.  As such, 
                                                            
1 In Being and Time Heidegger uses two verbs which are best translated into English as ‘to articulate’.  
These are gliedern and artikulieren.  In German, the former, gliedern, means ‘to articulate’ in the sense of 
‘to divide into’, ‘to separate’ or ‘to organise’ – the word Glied means ‘limb’ or ‘member’.  On the 
other hand, artikulieren means ‘to articulate’ in the sense of ‘to highlight and distinguish’ or ‘to make 
distinct’.  Blattner suggests that their common English translation, ‘to articulate’, be disambiguated 
by specifying that in the case of the word gliedern what is meant is structural articulation, and that in 
the case of artikulieren what is meant is an expressive articulation (See Blattner, W. D., Heidegger’s Being 
and Time, Continuum, London, 2011 at 98-99).  In this sense, gliedern means ‘to parse’, and 
artikulieren means ‘to put into words’.  In their translation of Being and Time, Macquarrie and 
Robinson use ‘articulate’, with a lower-case ‘a’, for gliedern, and ‘Articulate’, with an upper-case ‘a’, for 
artikulieren (see Macquarrie and Robinson’s footnote 1 in Heidegger, M., Being and Time (trans. 
Macquarrie, J. & Robinson, E.), Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, 1962 at 195, H 154).  Wherever it is 
relevant or necessary in this paper, these renderings are employed. 
2it outlines and suggests the possibility and preferability of a phenomenological – as 
opposed to a metaphysical – account of what language is, attempts to show the 
universality and ubiquitousness of language in human being, and illustrates the 
opening ‘way’ to language qua language which Heidegger’s mature thinking was 
eventually to take.
